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Summary  findings
In the policy  environment prevailing  before  liberalization  will not happen instantaneously  when the
implementation of the Uruguay  Round results,  exports  Uruguay  Round results  come into force. Agricultural
from developing  countries face significant  nontariff  tariffication  will occur immediately,  but the MFA will be
measures  in industrial  countrics.  phased out over ten years and VERs  will be eliminated
Based  on 1992 trade flows,  the import covcrage  ratio  over four years.
of nontariff measures  on this trade was more than 18  Considering  rhe cxtent of the liberalization  presaged
percent, compared with less  than 11 percent for trade  by these  policy changes,  Low and Yeats  speculate about
among industrial  countries.  likely  souxres  of pressure for measures  to mitigate  the
Trade liberalization  measures  agreed to in the Uruguay  effects of removing nontariff measures.  They conclude
Round will dramatically  reduce the incidence  of nontariff  that the greatest risks will probably come from
measures  on developing  country exports: the coverage  safeguards  and antidumping.
ratio will drop to less  than 4 percent on nonoil exports.  The new safeguards  agreement  permirs  the use of
This change has the dual effect of increasing  export  quantirative  restrictions ro stem the flow  of injurious
market opportunities for developing  counrr.-es  and of  imports, and alrhough rhe  agreemenr tightens  exisring
substantially  reducing  - if nor eradicating  - the  GATT rules in some respects,  it loosens  them in others.
relatively  negative  bias against developing  country  The antidumping instrument has been used with
exports.  increasing  frequency  by an increasing  number of
These impressive  results from the Uruguay  Round are  countries in the past two decades  or more. The efforts of
attributable to -tariffication" in agriculture, the abolition  several  governments in the Uruguay  Round to impose
of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement  (MFA),  and the  additional controls on antidumping met with little
elimination of voluntary export restraints (VERs)  under  success,  and antidumping  continues to offer considerable
the safeguards  agreement But all these aspects of  scope for imposing  protectionist trade measures.
This  paper-a  productof the International  Trade  Division,  International  Economics  Department-is  part of a larger  effort
in the department to analyze  and predict  structural changes  in trade and to quantify  factors  affecting  developing  countries'
exports. Copies  of the paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please
contact Jean Jacobson, room R2-055, extension 33710 (25 pages).  August 1994.
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I. LU1rodul
It is often argued that OECD protectionism  has an important  restrictive effect on the exports and
growth prospects of developing countries (see World Bank 199,  1993).  It has also been asserted that
GATT's muldtiateral  trade negotiation (MTfN)  process has not sewved  developing countries as well as it
has indusftri  nations.  The fact that the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds achieved considerably lower  than
average reductions in tariff barriers on products of major export interet  to developing countries is cited
as supporting evidence  for this point (see UNCTAD 1968, 1982).'  Relaed empirical studies also show
that fth structure and types of OECI) tariffs often discriminate  agains developing  countries. Specifically,
developed countries'  import  duties generally increase or  HcscalatU  with the  level of  a  product's
fabrication awl this is thoght  to be an important constraint to processing of domesticaily produced
commodities in developing countries (see UNCrAD 1968, BaLass 1968, Helleiner and Welwood 1978,
or Yeats 1987)2
'The Commonwealth  Secreariat (1982, p, 29) noted -At the outset  the Tokyo Declaration  anonoiced an
intention  to provide  a better  balance  as between  developed  and  developing  couimtres  in the  sharing  of the advantages
resulting from the expanion of international  trade ....  The result  did not lIve up to thee  ambition and
expectations.  Whie average  tarffs on industria  product were reduced  by about  one-third  on an import  weighted
basis, the reduction  for developing  country  products  was  only  about  one-quarter  on base (protecton)  levels  which
were already  significanty  higher.  The minimal  progres made in liberalizing  agricutural  trade, and the frct that
quantiative  restrictons under  VERs  and 0MAs were  not considered,  reduced  the significanc  of the Round  Stil
fturther  for deveoping  countries.*-
2Dr  trpM of tariffs applied  are important. Specifically,  Yeat (1976)  found  that developed  counties often
single  out products  in which  developing  countres have a comparative  advantage  and apply  specific  (i.e., fixed-
charge-per-unit)  duties  to these  items. Becaus unit  values  of shipment from developing  countries  are  generally
lower  than  those  for similar  tariff  line  level  goods  produced  in industrial  countries  (due  to production  cost  &r quality
diffrentials)  specific  tariffs  were  found  to have  nominal  equivalent  for the  developing  countries'  products  that  were:
roughly  doubie  those for industrial  countrie.2
Apart from tariffs, developing countries generaly regard OECD nontariff measures (NTMs) as
baving an even more negative impact on their exports.  The UNCrAD Secreta  (1993, p. 41) shows
that nontariff measures inposed  by industrial countries cover a nuch  higher share of  imports  from
developing  countries than they do in respect of intra-OECD  trade (see Table 1 for World  Bank estimates).
Almost one fift  of all non-fuel imports from developing countries are subject to NTMs in industrial
country markets, while the corresponding share for trade among industrial countries is about one-tenth.
The purpose of this paper is to determine how far the Uruguay Round, when its results are fully
implemented, will change the level, nature and incidence of OECD countries' NTMs on developing
countries' exports.  Preliminary information on what the Round accomplished suggests that a major
change has occurred, yet little or no quantitative  evidence  has been produced thus far on the magnitude
of the change.  By utilizing a trade information  system mainined  by the World Bank and UNCTAD,
this study atteLp5s to estimate how the Uruguay Round will alter the profile of NTM protection facing
developing countries, both in total and for regional groups of exporters.  After an overall assessment of
the findings, the study goes on to anticipate how OECD countries may atempt to neutralize or  "claw
back" the trade liberalition  implied by the loss of NTM protection.
II. Nontariff Measures Facing Develooir  Countries
Utilizing World Bank-UNCTAD  records on OECD trade barriers, Table 1 shows the share of
these countries'  imports from: (i) all industrial counties,  and (ii) all other countries that encounter
NTMs.  The data show that OECD nontariff measures affect a notably higher share of imports from
3Laird  and Yeats  (1990,  Chapter  4) provide  a detailed  description  of how  this inventory  of nontariff  measures
was  construtd  and what  its limitaions  are for research  and polcy studies. In particular,  tade coverage  ratios  are
a rough approimation  of the importance  of NTMs, in dua they  give no indication  of the restrictiveness  of the
measures  concerned.  Low  coverage  ratios  could  be assocated  with  higbly  rcstictive  NTMs,  and  vi-versa.  The
Laird and Yeats  book  also provides  extensive  empircal information  on the results  of NTM  mvetory studies  for
industi  comntries. UNCTAD  (1993, p. 37) tabulate the amnal share of developing  counties' exports that
encountered  nonaiff  measures  over the last  decade.  The  share of developing  countries  non-fuel  exports  covered
by NTMs rose from 16.2  percent  in 1981  to 18.3  percent  in 1991.3
Table 1.  1992 Noutariff  Measure (NTM)  Coverage  Ratios for OECD Imports from Developed
and Developing  Countries.
____________________________  1992  Imports  (Smillion)  NTM!  Covcrage Ratios
Developing  Industrial  Developing  industrial
Product  Group  (SlTC)  Countries  Countries  Countries  Countries
ALL NON-FUEL  ITEMS  (0 to 9 - 3)  530,740  1,910,710  18.4  10.4
All Foods  (0+1+22+4)  77,083  192,590  18.3  28.0
Food  and  Live Anmbal  (0)  67,732  154,280  19.2  29.8
ailseeds  and Nuts  (22)  2.502  5.856  9.8  4.2
Aninmal-Vegetable  Oils (4)  2,829  5,081  7.8  8.3
Agricultural  Materials  (2-22-27-28)  20,076  53.580  10.9  5.0
Ores  and Metals  (27+28  +67+68)  41,627  117,073  10.0  13.7
Ferrou Metals  (67)  11,063  55.555  35.6  38.3
Non-fmorros  Metal (68)  15,116  37,859  0.0  0.0
Mineral  Fuels  (3)  164,420  86,205  16-5  21.5
Chemicals  (5)  21,806  216,939  3.4  5.9
Other  Manufactures  (6 to 8-67-68)  354,370  1,290.212  21.6  912
Leather  (61)  3,741  5,013  56.5  29.6
Textile  Yarn  & Fabric  (65)  18.375  50,651  52.1  9.0
Clothing  (84)  75,293  47,615  64.3  7.0
Footwear  (85)  15,844  12,163  34.0  16.8
ALL ITMS (0 to 9)  1695,160  11,966,916  1  18.0  10.9
Source:  World  Bank-UTNCTAD  SMIART  Dat-abas.  Trade  data  from UN COMfTRADE  Records.
Notes:
(1). Trade  and NTMd  coverage  ratios  are for the following  markets:  Australi, Austria,  Canada,  EEC(12),  Finland,
Japan,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Sweden,  Switzerland  and the United  State.
(2).Tbe following  tys  of measures  have  been included  in the computation  of the NIl  trade  coverage  index:
surcharges,  variable  levies,  quantitative  restrictions  (mncluding  prohibitions,  quotas,  non-automatic  licensing,  'voltuny'  export
restAnts and restaints under the MFA and similar  xtie  arrangements,  and st  monopolies),  price control measures
(inluding minimum,  reference  or basic  import  price  systems,  price  survelce  and  voluntary  export  price  restraints),  additional
custm  formalities  and  er  entry  control  measures,  and local  content  requirements.4
developing  countries  tha  the  do imports  from  oilier  industrial  countries. Approximately  18 percent  of
developing  countries'  non-oil  exports  encounter  NTMs,  while  the corresponding  share  for OECD  intra-
trade is about 10 percent. The statistics  for several  product  groups  reveal  an even  greater difference  in
developing-industrial  country  coverage  ratios.  Between  52 and 64 percent of developing  countries'
textiles  and clothing  exports  face  restrictions  as compared  to under  10 percent  of OECD  exports  of these
goodIS. 4 Nontariff  measure  coverage  ratios  for developing  countries'  exports  of leather  and  footwear  are
17 to 27 points higher tha  shipments  of these products  from industrial  countries. Voluntary  export
restraints  and special  imprt authorization  procedures  largely  account  for these  coverage  differences.
Table  1 shows  that  coverage  ratios  are not  always  higher  for developing  countries.  In food items,
for example, the coverage  ratio for industria countries  is 28 percent, compared  to 1  8 percent for
developing  countries. This is largely  explained  by the fact that tropical  products, like coffee,  tea and
cocoa,  accounting  for approximately  15  percent  of developing  countries'  food  exports,  face  relatively  fe-w
OECD  nontariff  measures.  Most  industrial  country  NTMs  are applied  to temperate  zone  food products
(particularly  grains  and dairy  products),  which  are mainly  exported  by other OECD  countries.
Table 2 provides another  perspective  on nontariff  protecton facing  developing  countries  by
showing  trade  coverage  ratios  for different  types  of restrictions  and by the  product  gro-ups  to which  they
are applied. Within  foods  and feeds,  variable  import  levies  are the most commonly  applied  restrictions,
accounting  for 52 percent  of all NTM-covered  trade in the group,  followed  by quantitative  restrictions
'Estimates  of the restrictive  effect  of NTMs  in these  sectors  show  the  barrers are indeed  formidable.  The
USlTC  (1989)  estimaed  that  the  ad  valorem  equivalents  of existing  US  NTMs  on  54 broad  categories  of textile  and
clothing  products  ranged  between15  to over 100percent. Laird  and  Yeats  (1990)  found  that  estimates  for nominal
equivalents  of NTMs  on  grains,  sugar,  dairy,  vegetable  oils,  poultry,  pork  oilseeds  and  nuts  imported  into fth  EU
and Japan ranged  from 50 to 300  percent  and more. See also Saxon  and Anderson  (1982)  and OECD  (1987).Table 2. Analysb  of the Types  and Relative  Importance  of OECD  Nontariff  Measures  on lmports from Developing  Counties.
Trade  Coverage  Rados_
1992  Imports  from  All  Variable  Volunta'  I  Price  Other  Entry
Developing  Nontariff  Levies  and  Quantitative  Export  Control  Control
Product  Group  (SITC)  Countries  (Sbill.)  Measures2  Surcharges  Restrictions  RestraimLs  Measures  Measures
ALL  NON-FIJEL  ITEMS  (0 to 9 - 3)  530,740  18.4  1.9  2.2  12.4  1.5  2.3
All Foods  (0+1+22+4)  77,083  18.3  9.6  5.4  2.1  3.1  2.4
PFtl and  Live  Animals  (0)  67,732  19.2  10.6  5.2  2.4  3.3  2.6
Oilseeds  and  Nuts  (22)  2,502  9.8  0.5  9.3  0.0  0.0  0.0
AnImal-Vegetable  Oils  (4)  2,829  7.8  5.6  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.8
agricultural  Materials  (2-22-27-28)  20,076  10.9  0.1  1.A  0.1  0.0  10.0
Ores  and  Metals  (27+28+67+68)  41,627  10.0  0.1  0.5  5.5  6.5  0.0
Perrous  Metals  (67)  11,063  35.6  0.0  1.0  20.2  23.6  0.0
Non-ferrous  Metals  (68)  15,116  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
In
Mineral  Fuels  (3)  164,420  16.5  2.4  14.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
Chemicals  (5)  21,806  3.4  1.1  2.2  0.1  0.0  0.0
Other  Manufactures  (6 to 8-67-68)  354,370  21.6  0.4  1.7  18.3  0.5  2.1
Leather  (61)  3,741  56.5  0.8  0.3  0.2  0.0  55.2
Textile  Yam & Fabric  (65)  18,375  52.1  1.7  6.2  49.0  0.0  0.0
Clothing  (84)  75,293  64.3  0.8  3.4  59.3  0.0  3.3
Footwear  (85)  15,844  34.0  1.2  1.0  29.9  0.0  3.3
ALL  ITEMS  (O  to 9)  695,160  18.0  2.0  5.0  9.5  1.2  1.8
Source:  World  Bank-UNCTAD  SMART  Database.  Trade  statistics  from  UN COMTRADB  records.
INTM  groups  are defined  as follows.  Variable  levies  and surcharges  include  all variable  import  levies  (including  variable  components),  product  specific  surcharges.
minimum,  reference,  or basic  import  price  regulations,  price  surveillance  and 'voluntary"  export  price  restraints.  Quantitative  restrictions  include  prohibidons,  quotas  (global
or country  specific),  .te monopolies  and non-automatic  licensing  requirements.  'Voluntary export  restraints  include  measures  under  the MFA  and similar  textile  quotas  as
well  as other  VERs  (  quantity)  that  were negotiated  outside  the textile  and  clothing  sectors. Other  entry  control  measures  include  a variety  of restrictions  like  local  content
regulations,
Mrhe  coverage  shares  for the individual  types  of NT.Ms  may  sum  to more  than  the 'all NTM coverage  ratio  due to 'stacking'  or the multiple  applicadon  of NTMs
on a specific  product. Imports  are for those  OECD  countries  listed  in the notes  to Table  1.6
(30  percent  of covered  trade),  and  other  price  control  measures  (like  minimum  import  prices  -17  percent
of the total). 5
Outside  agriculture,  'voluntary' export  restraints  (VERs)  are among  the most  conmnonly  applied
restrictions  facing  developing  countries  due  to their  extensive  application  on textile  and  clothing  products.
Although  the United  States  abolished  quantitative  restrictions  on footwear  in the mid-1980s,  almost  one-
third of exports of footwear  to the OECD  are covered  by NTMs, generally  in the forn of VERs (see
Greenaway,  1985  for an analysis  of the operation  of VERs applied  by the UK against  Taiwan, China,
and the Republic  of Korea).  Several  entries  in Table  2 also  warrant  clarification.  The OECDI  coverage
ratio of almost  17 percent  for energy  imports  (SITC  3) from developing  countries  reflects  Japan's  global
quotas on coal and tariff quotas  on petroleum  oils.  In addition,  the United  States imposed  product
specific import charges on some petroleum  products  in 1987 which had the intention  of equalizing
domestic and international  prices.  Special entry regulations in Fte EU  (including  eco-labelling
requirements)  are applied  to almost  all leather  imports  including  highly  processed  leather 
account  for the 56 percent  NTM  coverage  ratio  for leather  (see Varangis  et. al. 1993  for an analysis  of
the effects  of eco-labelling  requirements  on trade).
M. Accomplishments  of the Uruguv Round
The foregoing  discussion  establishes  two main points. First, in the pre-Uruguay  Round  policy
environment,  developing  countries  face  significant  NTMs  in industrial  country  markets  across  a key  range
of sectors. Second,  the incidence  of these  measures  is considerably  greater against  developing  country
exports  than  against  industrial  country  exports. The  present  section  exariines  briefly  how this  situation
Due  to the multiple  application  or mtacidngf  of several  NTMs  on single  tariff  lines, tnade  coverage  ratios  for
the dififrent  types of restrictions  may  sum  to a larger toal than that shown  for all nontariff  measures  as a group.
Ms  an illustrafion  US imports  of cane sugar (tariff  line 17011100)  face three different  nontariff  mcasures:  tariff
quotas;  flexible  import  fees (variable  levies);  and global  quotaS.7
has changed as a  result of commitments under the Uruguay Round, which should lead to  a  sharp
reduction in the use of NTMs as an instrument of trade policy.  The most relevant parts of the Uruguay
Round results in this context are the agreements on agriculture, textiles and clothing, and safeguards.
Augriculture
After more  an  four decades during which the agricultural sector was excluded from mainstream
GATT  rules,6 the  Uruguay Round achieved a  major breakthrough.  The agreement requires that
participating govermnents do not "maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have
been ....  converted into ordinary customs duties." 7 The measures to be so converted include virtually
all nonitariff measures.  Specific mention is made of quantitative import restrictions, variable import
levies, minimum import prices, discretionary  import licensing, and nontariff measures  maintained  through
state trading enterprises, and voluntary export restraints.
Nontariff measures are to  be  converted into ad  valorem or  specific tariffs as soon as  the
agreement enters into force.  The resultant tariffs are to be "bound"' and reduced gradually over a period
of six years.'  The agreement includes a special safeguard measure, which allows an additional duty to
be imposed on a product if its price falls or the volume of imports increases  by a specified amount.  Since
the special safeguard is a price-based measure, its application would not raise the NTM coverage ratio.
- The conversion of NTMs under the "tariffication" exercise is based on the ;tual  difference
between internal and external prices during the years  1986-88.  The relevant calculations have been
Tor a detailed  discussion  of how  agriculture  and textiles  were excluded  from  GATT  rules, and how  safeguards
disciplines  became  weaker  over the years, see Low (1993).
7Article  4.2 of the Agreement  on Agriculture.
'A tariff  binding  is the legally  set maximum  rate at which  a tariff  may be set. Actual  tariffs  can be below  the
bound  rate, but cannot  go above  it unless  the rate is renegotiated  with trading  partners.
MThe  penod is extended  to ten  years  for developing  countries,  and the  least-developed  countries  are not  required
to make  any reductions,  although  they  are also prohibited  from  maintining  nontariff  measures.8
undertaken  at the four-digit  or six-digit  level of the Harmonized  System. Tariff equivalents  for most
processed  products  were not calculated  from-  direct  price comparisons,  but in terms of the aggregate  of
comnponent  parts multiplied  by their  proportion  in the product. Both the base  year for the tariffication
exercise  and the manner  in which  the calculations  are undertaken  could  lead  to increases  in the level  of
protection in the short-term,  but any such increases  would be dissipated  by the tariff reduction
commitmnts.' 01  In  addition, tariffied products are  subject to  minimum or  current  access
requirement," which are to be guaranteed  where necessary  through  tariff rate quotas.  Reduction
comdmitets have  also been  undertaken  in respect  of domestic  support  measures  and  export subsidies.
A narrowly  defined  exception  has been  made to the general  elimination  of nontariff
measures. Countries  may designate  certain  agricdulturl  products  for 'special treatmnent"  if they meet
specified  criteria, thereby exempting  them from the tariffication  requirement. Despite  the right to
maintain  NTMs on designated  products,  minimum  access  requirements  will also apply?" In order to
qualify for special treatment,  imports  of designated  products  must comprise  less than 3 percent of
corresponding  domestic  consumption  in the base period  (1986-88). Second,  designated  products  should
not have  benefitted  from any export  subsidies  since  the beginning  of the base period. Third, measures
restricting  domestic  production  should  be applied  to the relevant  prmimary  agricultural  product.  The
stringency  of these  condfitions  means  that  relatively  few  products  will  qualify. The most  obvious  one that
will is rice from Japan.
1t1 lndustria  countries  will  reduce  tariffs  by 36  percen  over  six  years  and  developing  countries  will  do so
by 24 peren over  ten  years.
"Minimum  access  opportunities  are  to be provided  when  imports  of a product  sub~ject  to tariffication  are  less
than  5 percet of domestic  consumption  in the  base  pediod  (1986-88).  The  minimunam  access  opportunfity  is equal
to 3 percent  of  base  period  consumption  in the  first  year,  rising  to 5 percet in six  years. In the  case  where  imports
of tariffied  products  exceeded  5 percent  of consumption  in the base  period,  countries  must  miaintain  the acces
opportunity  that  existed  in fth  base  period.
'2Tke  miniTmum  access  requirement  on designaed  product'  will  bring  their  level  of  penetration  from  a minirmum
of 4 percent  up to 8 percent  by the  end  of  thec  six-year  ipmetinperiod.  This  requirement  could  lead  to an
increase  in the NTM  coverage  ratio.9
Txie,  and Cloth
Discriminatory  quantitative  restrictions  have  been  prevalent  in the textiles  and clothing  sector  for
over thirty yars,  starting  with the Short-Tern  Arrangement  Regarding  International  Trade in Textiles
in 1961  (Low, 1993). This was followed  in 1962  by the Long-Tenn  Arvangement  until 1974,  when the
first Multi-Fiber  Arrangement  (MFA)  came  into being. The current  arrangunent, MFAIV,  runs until
December  31, 1994. These  arrangements  have  covered  a growing  nurnber  of products  over the years,
and have become  increasingly  restrictive.
From  the  beginning,  quantitative  restrictions  under  the  MFA  have  been  administered  by exporting
countries. Many  developing  countries  considered  the elimination  of the MFA a priority  in the Uruguay
Round,  bearing  in mind  that  textiles  and  clothing  is a key  industry  in the early  stages  of industrialization,
and the fact  that, with the exception  of Japan,  the quantitative  restrictions  only  affect  developing  country
exports  to the industrial  countries,  and not  trade among  the industrial  countries.
The Agreement  on Textiles  and Clothing  in the Uruguay  Round  provides  for the elimination  of
MAFA-type  arrangements,  or in other words, of all NTMs  in the sector, over a ten-year  period.  The
phase-out  of NTMs  is gradual,  involving  the progressive  elimination  of quantitative  restraints  by product
category, combined  with continuing  quota expansion. Restrictions  must be removed  from products
accounting  for not less  than  16 percent  in volume  tenns (1990)  of the items  covered  by the MFA as soon
as the agreement  enters  into  force. There  are then  three  additional  phases  that take  effect  at the beginning
of the fourth  and eighth  years  and end of the tenth  year, in which  an additional  17 percent,  18 percent
and 49 percent  respectively  of 1990  import  volumes  must  be fully  integrated  into  the mainstream  trading
system.
The agreement  also  establishes  a "transitional  safeguard"  mechanism  that  allows  NTMs  to be used
in certain  circumstances.  These  safeguards  can be applied  if increased  import  volumes  cause  or threaten
serious  damage  to the  domestic  industry,  and  they  can  be maintained  fbr a maxiimum  of three  years. The10
safeguard  is invoked  on a country  by country  basis, but can  only be applied  on products  which  have  not
yet been integrated  into mainstream  GATT/WTO  rules (i.e. products  on which  MFA-type  quotas  may
still  be applied). A second  restriction  on the use of the special  safeguard  is that it cannot  be invoked  on
an eligible  (non-integrated)  product  if that product is already subject  to an MFA quota in the market
concerned.
Before  they are removed,  quotas  must  be expanded  by not less  than  the amount  of quota  growth
during  the twelve  month  period  prior to entry into force  of the agreement,  plus 16 percent,  25 percent
and 27 percent in each of the three periods of the phase-out. Quota  expansion  during the phase-out
period  could increase  NTM  coverage  ratios in this sector.
Unlike  agriculture,  where  the removal  of  most  NTMs  will  occur  immediately  the  agreement  enters
into force, the process  in the textiles  and clothing  sector  will be much  more  gradual. Indeed,  49 percent
of all quota  restrictions  by volume  existing  in 1990  could  still  be in place  until  the last day  of the ten year
phase-out  period.  Use of the transitional  safeguard  could  also raise the coverage  of NTMs above  the
levels yielded by the three period phase-out  schedule. Moreover,  since the MFA and its phase-out
program are built on a series of bilateral  arrangements,  and countries  face quite different  levels of
restrictions,  it is difficult  to make any straightforward  judgements  about NTM coverage  ratios in this
sector, except  to say that  they will all be zero  after ten years.
Over  the years, the GAIT's safeguard  provisions  have  been  used less  and less. This was partly
because  governments  preferred  to seek bila:eral  accommodation  when addressing  import competition
considered  unacceptably  damagmg  to domestic  industry. The GAlT's  safeguard  rules permit  the use
either  of import  duties  or quanitatve restrictions,  but  require  a nondiscriminatory  application  of measures
and payment  of compensation  through  additional  trade liberalization.Voluntary export  restraints,  and  similar bilateral arrangements involving exporters in  tflu
administration of restrictions, became an increasingly  commnon  approach to rhe protection of domestic
industries.  For their part, exporters wished to avoid the inferior outcome of import restrictions, where
they would exercise less control and stand a slimmTer  chance of enjoying any of the rents deriving from
the restrictions.  Importers preferred a less transparent protective arrangement, and one where neither
explicit compensation nor the constraint of the nondiscrimirnation  rule would apply.
Another reason why safeguard measures became less frequent may  have been the growing
popularity of antidumping  and countervailing  duty actions. While safeguard actions arc a tac-it  admission
of the inability of a domestic industry to compete, antidumping  and countervailing  duties are instruments
whose justification  is  the  counteraction of  unfair  behavior on  the  part  of  foreign producers  or
govmern.
The Uruguay Round Agreerinent  on Safeguards seeks to provide more flexible arrangements, but
under tighter rules.  There is a relaxation  of the nondiscrimination  rule in exceptional  circumstances, and
no compensation  or retaliation is foreseen during the first thre  years that a measure is applied.  On the
other hand, safeguards can only be applied for a limited period (four years, renewable for a further four),
and cannot be renewed during tie  same amnount  of time for which they were originally applied.  In
addition, safeguards must be progressively liberalized, and arc subject to surveillance  and review.
The most signficant  feature of the safeguards agreement in the present context, however, is the
commitmnent  to etlminate all voluntary export restraint  (VERs). All VERs, with the exception  of one,'1 3
are to be removed within a period of four years.  T-his  commitment implies a significant reduction in
nontariff measures.  However, it is imnpossible  to say to what extent governments will take advantage of
their rights under the safeguards agreement to apply quantitative restrictions rather tha  price-based
Lrhe exception  of a single  measure  from the general  phase-our  commitment  was  designe to accommodate  the
wish  of the EU to continue  to restrict  Japanese  auto  imports. According  to the agreement,  however,  thec  single
exception  permitted  to each party  rnms  only  until December  31, 1999.12
measures when they take safeguard action.  The fact that VERs are ruled out, combined with relaxation
of the nondiscrimination, compensation, and retaliation rules, may encourage the use of safeguards in
general, and quantitative restrictions in particular.
IV. Global Trade Implications: The Round and NTMs
Given the global importance  of NTMs (Table 1 indicates  that $125 billion of OECD imports from
developing countries face these measures), this section seeks to quantify the extent to which the Uruguay
Round results will influence the level and structure of nontariff protection.  Using published details on
the agreement (GATT 1994), Table 3 provides an indication for all developing countries and regional
eountry groups (i.e., developing  countries in South Asia, Latin American and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan
Africa, etc.).  The top quarter of the table shows the 1992 values of OECD imports from each region -
- in total and for four product groups: all non-oil goods; ores, minerals and metals; chemicals; and all
other manufaures.  Directly below these import values, the pre-Uruguay Round NTM coverage ratios
are shown for each product and regional group.
The lower half of the table shows estimated post-Uruguay Round NTM trade coverage indices
under two alternative assumptions concerning trade values.  The first assumption allows for no change
in the value of OECD imports from developing countries  - this clearly overestimates  the importance of
remaining NTMs since there will be an import response in the cases where NTMs are removed. In order
to quantify the effects of the Round, NTM-ridden trade in agriculture, tectiles and clothing, along with
VERs on all other products, is subtracted from the total trade (in all sectors) covered by NTMs and the
remainder is then expressed as a ratio to the total value of OECD imports.  The second estimate - see
the lower quarter of the table - attempts to project the expansion of non-OECD trade that shouldTable 3. Estlnated Impact of the Uruguay Round on Regional Groups of Low and Mfddle Income Countries' NTM Coverage Ratlos.
Middle East  Middle  All
East  Eastern  Latin  and Nornh  Income  South  Sub-Saharan  LMIC
Product Group (SITC)  Asia  Europe  America  Africa  Europe  Asia  Africa  Countries
1992 Value of OECD Imports ($million)
ALL GOODS  197,262.4  67,123.3  118,140.1  38,364.7  36,008.8  32,772.1  28,905.3  519,576.6
All Non-Oil Goods  181,651.1  50,174.1  98,297.6  12,877.4  35,2f J.0  23,586.4  14,359.7  416,206.3
Ores and Metals  7,028.9  9,512.6  13,189.4  940.7  1,905.6  1,171.9  2,426.7  36,175.9
Chemicals  4,825.9  4,813.6  4,492.0  672.0  1,106.3  247.0  282.2  16,439.0
Other Manufactures  144,765.1  29,238.8  48,716.7  7,573.8  26,518.7  17,173.0  3,831.3  277,817.4
Ike-Uruguay  Round NTM Trade Coverage  Ratio  (%)
ALL GOODS  18.5  25.6  11.7  9.1  31.1  36.7  16.2  18.0
All Non-Oil Goods  19.5  19.8  11.2  7.8  32.3  37.8  15.5  18.4
Ores and Metals  9.4  19.3  9.6  19.6  12.2  1.5  6.1  10.0
Chemicals  3.3  4.8  3.5  7.0  1.1  1.8  0.2  3.4
Other Manufactures  21.9  19.1  10.4  3.4  41.7  48.9  10.5  21.6
Estimated  Post-Uruguay  Round  NTM Trade Coverage Ratio_(!) - Constant  Trade Values  w
ALL GOODS  3.6  14.0  3.9  6.!  2.1  5.5  9.5  5.5
All Non-Oil Goods  3.5  4.1  1.6  3.6  0.7  5.8  5.1  3.8
Ores and Metals  9.4  19.3  9.6  19.6  12.2  1.5  6.1  10.0
Chemicals  3.3  4.8  3.5  7.0  1.1  1.8  0.2  3.4
Other Manufactures  3.9  2.7  _  2.7  2.2  0.8  7.2  |  4.5  |  4.5
EFtimated  Past-Uruguay  Round NTM Trade Coverage  Ratios (%)  - Increased  Trade Values
ALL GOODS  2.6  11.8  3.4  5.8  1.1  3.5  8.5  4.2
All Non-Oil Goods  2.5  1.8  1,2  3.4  0.3  3.6  4.3  2.8
Ores and Metals  9A.  19.3  9.6  19.6  12.2  1.5  6.1  10.0
Chemicals  3.3  4.8  3.5  7.0  1.1  1.8  0.2  3.4
Odher  Manufactures  2.8  2.1  2.3  2.1  054.0  4.0  3.0
Note: The trade values and NTM coverage ratios shown in this table are for the OECD countries  listed in the notes to Table 1.
Source: World Bank-UNCTAD  SMART Database.14
occur for each regional country group as a result of the removal of nontariff measures (see World Bank,
1992 for published details concerning these estinates).  Total exports from developing countries are
assumed to equal pre-Uruguay Round trade plus the expanded trade that should result from the NTM
liberalization.  The NTM coverage ratios are then recomputed  using the procedures oudined in foomote
13, but with this new larger trade base.'4 Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the projected
magnitude of change in pre and post-Uruguay Round NTM coverage ratios for all non-oil exports of
developing countries.
Both Table 3 and Figure 1 indicate that the Uruguay Round dramatically changed the share of
developing countries' exports that faced OECD nontariff restrictions. Overall, the developing countries'
NTM coverage ratios decline by approximately  three-quarters, but for South Asia the ratio falls from 37
percent to about one-tent  its pre-Uruguay Round level. The main reason for this 33 percentage point
decline is the high share of textile and clothing products in South Asia's exports which are subject to
MFA restrictions. A similar decline  (from 31 to 1 percent) for middle income  Europe is attributable  both
to textiles and clothing and temperate zone agricultural products.
Figure 1 indicates that Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan  Africa will be the regions least affected
by the Uruguay Round achievements on nontariff measures. The Eastern European results are largely
"The projections  incorporate  two distinct  elements  i.e., trade  creation  (TCi,)  and trade diversion TIDi).  The
former represents  the substitution  of imports  for domestic  production  as trade barriers  are lowered. SMART
estimates  this term  using,
(2)  TCii =  [fru*e%*dwj  - [(1 +  t,*(  - (efi/e)],
where M, is the value of iports  of product i from couny  j, e  is the price eLasticity  of import  demand, tj is the
tariff on the product, and e,, is the supply  elasticity.  The projections were run using an assumed infinitely  elastic
supply  term. Trade  diversion  was estmated  from,
(3)  TDjj =  TCbi/[ii,
where the term in parentheses  is the share of imports  from non-prefece  receiving  countries  in domestic
consumption of the product.Table 4. Estimated Impact of the Uruguay Round on NTM Coverage Ratios for Indlitdual Developing  Countries.
Nontariff  Measure  Trade Coverage  Ratios  (%)
1992  OECD  Imports  ($million)  Pro-Uruguay  Round  Post-Uruguay  Round
Developing  Country  All  All Non-oil  OUter  All  All Non-oil  Other  All  All Non-oil  Other
Goods  Goods  Manufactures  Goods  Goods  Manufactures  Goods  Goods  Manufactures
Argentina  6,603.7  6,238.1  1,178.9  21.5  21.8  19.2  3.7  3.3  11.4 Bangladesh  2,059.9  2,056.4  1,862.4  58.3  58.6  74.1  10.5  10.4  13.3 Brazil  24,361.3  24,059.9  10,297.5  12.6  11.1  12.9  3.7  1.8  4.5 Chile  7,012.7  7,008.1  719.9  7.7  7.7  2.3  0.6  0.5  1.2 China  70,347.0  67,255,3  59,169.0  18.2  19.1  23.5  3.3  2.8  2.2 Dominican  Republic  2,710.9  2,710.9  2,155.3  35.7  35.7  39.8  0.2  0.2  0.1 Egypt  3,853.4  1,447.3  1,003.9  23.2  31.8  66.5  9.3  0.6  1.2 Haiti  145.2  145.2  122.5  13.2  13.2  15.3  0.4  0.4  0.0 Hong  Kong  26,367.6  26,365.6  25,147.6  34.3  34.3  35.3  1.8  1.8  1.8 India  13,532.3  13,162.2  10,551.1  29.4  30.6  40.9  5.1  5.4  7.1 lamaica  1,286.6  1,286.5  779.B  35.4  35.4  85.5  2.3  2.3  0.4 Jordan  147.7  147.7  91.0  2.3  2.3  0.6  1.1  1.1  0.5 Republic  of Korea  42,981.2  42,308.9  39,357.9  24.0  24.1  25.8  10.9  10.8  12.3  n Malaysia  23,862.1  21,536.9  16,021.3  6.5  7.5  13.1  0.7  0.7  0.9 Mexico  43,300.5  35,767.5  29,149.9  8.0  5.5  4.7  4.7  1.4  1.3 Morocco  4,777.8  4,700.3  2,705.4  30.2  30.5  46.4  3.0  2.8  6.6 Pakistan  3,978.6  3,967.6  3,511.7  50.4  50.4  59.6  6.9  6.8  8.2 Philippines  9,495.7  9,420.5  6,546.4  20.4  20.7  33.1  1.2  1.2  1.8 Senegal  362.4  356.8  21.2  25.2  25.2  9.0  0.9  0.9  7.2 Sri Lanka  2,066.5  2,058.8  1,709.7  50.5  50.7  67.8  0.9  0.8  0.5 Taiwan, China  55,334.7  55,311.4  50,621.6  12.0  12.0  13.1  3.1  3.1  3.4 Thailand  22,543.7  22,451.6  15,010.9  25.3  25.5  21.4  2.2  2.2  2.9 Tunisia  3,376.7  3,009.9  2,586.2  25.7  28.3  31.1  4.6  2.0  3.0 Uruguay  789.7  |  789.7  294.3  48.3  48.3  53.8  8.9  8.9  12.2
Note: The 1992  OECD Import  a;-d  trade  coverage  ratios are for those  countries  listed  in Table 1.  See Table I for an indication  of
the products included  in the outer manufactures  group.
Source:  World  Bank-UNCTAD  SMART  Database.Figure  1: The  Trade  Coverage  of OECD  Nontariff  Measures  on Regional  Groups  of
Developing  Countries  Non-Oil  Exports  Before  and After  the Uruguay  Round
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accounted for by the relatively high share at'  chemicals and energy products in total exports - these
products face quotas and special product-specific charges.  Eco-labelling requirements are largely
responsible for the relatively high share (about 6 percent) of sub-Saharan Africa's non-oil exports that
face post-Uruguay  Round NTMs.  The cost of compliance  with these requirements  may be relatively low.
However, Varangis et.  a].  (1993, p.20) suggest that their adoption could have potentially negative
mimplications  for African tropical trinter exports.
Table 4 provides a less aggregated view of the Uruguay Round's achievement  by showing how
the pre- and post-Uruguay Round NTM trade coverage ratios should change for selected developing
countries.  These projections are made under the constant trade value assumiption  and,  as a  result,
overstate the imnportance  of nontariff measures that will remain after the Round."1 Even so, the imnpact
on some countries is dramatic.  The NTM coverage ratio for all Sri Lankan exports, for  example,
declines from over 50 percent to  under 1 percent - an even greater reduction occurs within "other
manuifactures' (see Table 1 for a list of products included in this group).  A dec-line  of 40 perentage
points or more is.  also projected for Bangladesh  and Pakidstan.  The declines for all of these countries are
accounted for by the preponderance  of textiles and clothing products in their total exports.
V. Policy Substitution
T'he impending elimination of the bulk of NTMs faced by developing countries in industria
country markets is a remarkable achievement,  notwithstanding  the fact that the phase-out will take up to
ten years and that agricultural tariffication  might in some cases lead to short-tern increases in protection
15 Analysis  of our underlying  trade  and trade  barrer information  indicate  that several  two-digit  SITC  chemical
products  like  mineral  tars and crude  compounds  (SfTC  52), manufactured  fertilizers  (SITC  56), or plastic  materias
(SitC 58) will have trade coverage  ratios  ranging  from 5 to 10 percent  due to the imposition  of quotas  and
restrivctv licensing  regulations.  Tariff quotas  will apply  to over 10 percent  of wood manufactures,  wlbile  non-
automatic  licensing  regulations  will  be applied  to between  5 and 12  percent  of medicinal  product  imporbs  (SLTC  54)
and manufactred fertilizers  (SITC  56). Tariff  quotas  and specia product  specific  charges  (lie  retaliatoy duties)
wHil  remain  on a few products,  but their coverage  ratios  will  not exceed  2 percet  Special  entry  regulations,  like
eco-labeung requirements,  wll  continue  to be appled to a fay  high  of some crude material  products
classified  in SITC  2 as well as  true,  wood  and leather  manufacur.18
levels. The benefits  of these  changes  for developing  countries  come  not only in the form of prospective
increases  in export  sales,  but also  greater  predictability  of market  access. Another  significant  benefit  may
be greater  price stability  in international  markets  (Box 1).  Perhaps  it is the gradual  pace at which  the
reforms  will be introduced  that  makes  them  politically  palatable  in industrial  countries. But  considering
that the NTM problem remained  intractable  for so long, it is not unreasonable  to speculate  about the
likelihood  of renewed  demands  from industrial  country  producers  for new  measures  to insulate  them  from
imnport  competition.  In what policy  areas  might  such  pressures  emerge? The two most  likely  candidates
are safeguards  and antidluniping  measures.
It was noted  in Section  U[  that the new  safeguards  agreemnent  may result  in more frequent  use of
these measures, and that the option of applying  quantitative  limiitations  rather than tariffs may be
preferred. In particular,  a relaxation  of' the compensation  requiremnents,  combined  with the possibility
of a discriminatory  application  of safeguards,  could  encourage  their use.  In addition,  there appears  to
be some risk that measures  closely resembling  voluntary  export restraints (VERs)  may have been
legitimized  under  certain  conditions  in thie  new  agreemnent.  Article  I11  of the agreement  provides  for the
elimnination  of VE-Rs  and similar measures,  but a footnote  to the article states that an import quota
"applied  as a safeguard  measure  in conformity  with the relevant  provisions  of GATT 1994  and this
Agreement  may, by mutual  agreement,  be administered  by the exporting  Member.' A country  wishing
to make  use of this provision  must carry  out an investigation  and make  a determination  of serious  injury
or threat  thereof. These procedural  requirements  may temper the use of safeguards,  but not elimninate
the risk of VERs re-emerging  under  a quasi-official  guise.19
Box 1: Nontariff  Measures  and Price Instabiblty
;Iitial  andyses  of the Uruguay  Round's  accomplishments  relating  to NTMs  tend  to focus  on  whe
associated  trade gains. 7Tis orientation  understates  the importance  of what was achieved. Developing
:.countaie,  fior  cxample,  have long  beet concerned  with  the  effects  of price  and  earings instability  for their
7 major  exports  and ilis recognized-that  industrial  countries'  nontariff  nwasures  are an important  source  of
tbzs  iiistabffty. For.:  exle,  qimtas and other quantitative  restrictions  (Ike VERs) make the import
encrvetonpletely  inelastic  at the  point  where  they  become  operative. As such, any shift  in export
supply  .wilesul  ina  greater pe  cange  than that which would  occur under normal (not perfectly
:inelasic)  demanddconditions.  Similarly,  European  countries'  variable  import  levies-which  are widely
; applied  to aicultr  imports.-.are  designed  to shield  domestic  producers  from  instability  in agricultural
.:prices.:and  ein,but  in-doing  so bave  a destabilizing  influence  on international  markets.
Variableklevies  may have  both an upward  and downward  destabilizing  influence  on the products
to:which  the are applied.  -Whworld  prices  ris  variable  levies  fail and  may  become  negative  (i.e., they
become  subsidies.  on:  imort)  if the world  price  rises above  the EC's threshold  price.  In this case, EC
: 'import demand  is higher than under a nominul.  tariff.  The -excess  demand  in an inflationary  period
conitributes  to.a further  mcrease  in:world  prices. In periods  when world  prices  are falling,  however,  the
.ariale ievies  rise tereb  stricnganyincrease in demand. Thus, through  their peNrSe  effect  on:
import  demand  variable  levies  desbilize world  prices.  Although  the EC and many-  EFTA  countries  rely.Z.
.hiavily  on these  easures  iable-levies  are also used by the United  States  and Japan.
Aside from levies,  othrutypesofnontiff  msu are also recognized  to have  a destabilizing
impact  on intenational  tradc niid  prices.:  For example,  -in  an analysis  of international  commodity  markets
the OECD  (1982)  compiled  thiebllowing  maitrixi  which  showedbow  inteh  ntional price stability  woud  be
*  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~  ~  ~~  ~~  ~  ~  ....  . -.  ;  ..  . .. ... .........  .Variac  -of PrceIntabilit  Compared:  tof  InstbliyUndeir:
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P*e  Fixing 
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a.  ffeed  by differt  NTMs  relative  to what  would:  occur8  in a  ae  s  nThimortan  of  t
aboveclassification  is highlighted  by the:fact'that  Laird and  Yeats  (1990,Qp  .105) show that  more  than  70
percent~  of  EC(l0)  imports.of  meat, cereals,  dairy  products,  sugar  and honey.  live aimals, and  beverages
*iresubjectto.variable  import  levies or minimu  imiport  prices. Levies are also applied to over 80  percet
of Japan's uigatrand  honey  imporis  vwhile:fiied  quotas'ar-  applied  extsively  to Japan's  meat, dairy fish
:.aui  ocrl:impQrts.  Whilc  attempts  to  yexactmagnitudqes  would  beusel,:  is ev  indic
:*.:<  that the Urnguay.Round's  "tarifflcation'  of NTMswill  mnake  an-imporzant  contribution  to die  reduction  of
>  jlobal price and  trade  instabilityfor gricultul:raprodu.cts.20
The situation  with respect  to antidumping  is potentially  more troublesome  still.  Antidumping
measures have boen the subject of growing attention  in trade policy discussions,  as their use has
intensified  over the last decade  and more. Many analysts  emphasize  what they  regard  as a protectionist
bent in the formulation  and application  of antidumping  laws and regulations  (see, for example,  Boltuck
and Litan 1991, Finger 1993, Messerlin 1989, and Tharakan  1991). The most basic problem with
dumping  is that it is defined  merely  as price discrimination  between  the domestic  and export sales of a
firm. This makes  dumping  a ubiquitous  practice,  as profit  maximizg  firms  can be expected  to chargc
different prices in segmented markets.6  Instead of using antidumping  as a mechanism to deal with
welfare-reducing  pricing strategies,  as would  be the case were the practice to be defined  in terms of
predatory  pricing behavior,  antidumping  has become  yet another  instrument  in the arsenal of possible
measures  for insulating  domestic  producers  from import  competition. As Finger and Murray (1993)
show, the ease with which  the claim  of a positive  dumping  margin  can be supported  tends  to make the
injury test the only feature of the procedures  that may lead to an unsuccessful  antidumping  petition.
Several  of the authors  mentioned  above  have identified  procedures  and defnitions  used in antidumping
investigations  that bias the findings  in antidumping  cases  in favor  of petitioners.'
Attempts  by some  countries  in the Uruguay  Round  to impose  additional  discipline  on the use of
antidumping  measures  met with limited  success. While  providing  more  detailed  procedual guidelines
and exerting  additional  controls  in certain  areas, the agreement  does not provide  guarantees  against  the
use of antidumping  measures  that  can  severely  curtail  imports  over  an extended  period  of time. A general
"The  existence  of tariffs  against  imports  in  the  maket  of the  exporting  firm  will  be sufficient  to allow  the  firm
to charge  more  on  domestic  ta  export  sales,  and  thus  run the  risk of facing  an accusation  of unfair  tradig through
dumping.
r'For  example,  some  of the techniques  leading  to an upward  bias  in dumping  margin  calculations  include:  i)
identifying  a dunmped  sale  by comparing  an average  number  for domestic  sales  vith individual  observations  on
export  sales;  ii) excluding  sales  below  cost  in calculating  a domestic  price  for comparison  with  eport prices;  iii)
resortng to ' best information  available'  without  sufficient  critical  assessment  of available  data;  and  iv) constucing
costs  with arbitry  assumptions  about  profits  and adminisaive selling  costs.21
difficulty  with rules on such manors  as dumping  is that no matter  how  detailed  the rules become,  there
will nearly  always  remain  scope  for interpreting  them in ways  tat  produce  the desired  trade restricting
outcome. Restraint,  therefore,  will reside  primarily  in the behavior  of the administering  authorities,  not
in the constraints  of the law.  Any hope that precedents  might be established  to tilt decisions  more in
favor  of respondents  in antidumping  cases  seems  remote  in the  face of dispute  settlement  provisions  that
prohibit  panes from choosing  between  competing  "pennissible"  interpretations  of the agreement.
Table 5 records the number of antidumping  cases initiated by signatories to  the GATT
Antidumping  Code  fiom 1985-92.  The  Table  shows  the predominance  of the  EU, United  States,  Canada,
and Australia  as users of antidumping  measures,  although  Mexico  has been  catching  up in recent  years.
Few developing  countries  use antidumping  mechanisms,  but an increasing  number  are introducing  or
reviving  dormant  antidumping  legislation."8  In contrast  to the situation  in respect  of pre-Uruguay  Round
NTMs, it is the industral  countries  rather  than  developing  countries  that  are affected  by the bulk of the
measures  taken. However,  if anidumping  actions  are used  by industrial  countries  as a substitute  for the
NTMs  phased  out in the Uruguay  Round,  then  developing  countries  will find  themselves  on the receiving
end of an increasing  proportion  of a growing  total  number  of antiduniping  actions.
VI. Conclusions
The Uruguay  Round  will bring about  a dramatic  reduction  in the use of NTMs in the areas of
trade where these measures  have predominated  in the past.  The effect  will be most noticeable  in the
agriculture  and textiles  and clothing  sectors,  but the phasing  out of VERs  will also have  a significant
"Countries  not listed  as users in Table  5 that have  recenty introduced  or re-actvated  antidumping  legislation
include  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Chile,  China,  Colombia,  Egypt,  Indonesia,  Israel,  Jamaica,  Malaysia,  Morocco,  Peru,
the Philippines,  South  Afica, Thailand,  Trinidad  and Tobago,  and Venezuela.22
Table 5: Initation of Antidm  ug  Invetlgtions,  1985-fl
Country or petitioner  No. of cases  Country or respondent  No. of case
European  Union  242  European  Union  or Member  209
States
Japan  3  Japan  105
United  Stares  300  United  States  100
Korea  9  Republic  of Korea  78
China  69
China. Taiwan  68
Brazil  13  Brazil  54
Yugoslavia  (former)  31
Canada  129  Canada  25
Poland  24  Poland  24
Czech  Republic  & Slovakia  23
Romania  23
Hong Kong  22





India  5  India  17
USSR  (fonner)  16








South  Africa  6
Colombia  5
Philippines  5
Saudi Arabia  5
Bulgaria  4
Finland  13  Finland  4




Australia  282  Austalia  2
Kazakhstan  2
Russian  Federation  2
Trinidad and Tobago  2
Ukraine  2
l  Others  47
TOTAL  1148  TOTAL  1141
Source: GATT (1993) International Trade and the Trading System: Report  by the Director General 1992-1993
(Geneva:  GATI).23
impact. Although  NTMs  in the  agricultural  sector  will be almost  entirely  eliminated  as soon  as the rsults
of the Uruguay  Round  enter into force, many  textilea  and clothing  restrictions  could  take  as long as ten
years to eliminaze,  and VERs  will be phased  out over a period  of four years. The implications  of the
drastic  reduction  in NTMs  foreseen  in the Uruguay  Round  are  more far-reaching  for developing  countries
than industrial  countries  in terms of their export  interests,  because  of the more extensive  application  of
NTMs  to developing  country  trade. In this sense,  the Uruguay  Round  will contribute  to a more olevel
playing  field."
The success  of the Uruguay  Round  in reducing  the use of NTMs  is likely  to generate
pressures  for new  measures. A major  challenge,  therefore,  especially  in the industrial  countries,  will be
to resist demands  for policy  substitution. The greatest  risk of this occurring  comes in the areas of
safeguards  and antidumping  measures. Certain modifications  in the safeguards  provisions  make the
remedy  more  user-friendly,  especially  in terms  of relaxing  the compensation  requirements  and  pernitting
a disciminatory  application  of safeguards  under  certain  circumstances.  On  the other  hand,  the  safeguards
agreeent  requires that proper investigations  and deterninations  are made prior to the adoption  of
safeguard  measures.  Moreover,  the agreement  ought to induce  greater multilateral  accountability.
Another  advantage  of the new arrangements  is that safeguard  measures  must be if limited  duration.
Trends in the use of antiduniping  measures  over the last decade  or so, together  with the failure  of the
Uruguay  Round to impose  stronger limitations  upon the use of these measures,  suggest  significant
potential  for the antidumping  instrument  to become  the cuting edge  of discriminatory  protection  in the
post-Uruguay  Round  trading  system. How willing  will governments  be to resist  such a trend?24
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